Governing the commons (Record no. 746)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01808nam a2200169Ia 4500
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250117103459.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 250117s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9780521405997
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 333.2OST
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Ostrom, Elinor.
245 #0 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Governing the commons
Remainder of title the evolution of institutions for collective action
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 1990
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xviii, 280 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-270) and index
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Commons.
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Total checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
        UONGOZI Institute Resources Centre - Dar es Salaam UONGOZI Institute Resources Centre - Dar es Salaam 01/17/2025   333.2OST 00073047 01/31/2025 01/17/2025 Book